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Embracing Crimmigration to Curtail
Immigration Detention
Pedro Gerson*
Immigration advocates have long objected to both the constitutionality and conditions of
immigration detention. However, legal challenges to the practice have been largely unsuccessful
due to immigration law’s “exceptionality.” Placing recent litigation carried out against
immigration detention during the COVID-19 pandemic within the context of the judiciary’s
approach to immigration, this Article argues that litigation is an extremely limited strategic
avenue to curtail the use of immigration detention. I then argue that anti-immigration
detention advocates should attempt to incorporate their agenda into criminal legal reform and
decarceration efforts. This is important for both movements. Normatively, immigration
detention raises comparable issues: Namely, that jailing people is, on the one hand, an extreme
and cost-ineffective form of social control, and on the other, a tool to marginalize or “otherize”
entire communities. Furthermore, there is evidence that ongoing efforts to decarcerate states
and localities may be foiled by immigration detention. To the extent, therefore, that
decarceration reforms are based on commitments to freedom or condemnation of the extensive
use of carceral institutions, they are incomplete and even dangerous without including measures
to address immigration detention. Immigration advocates, on the other hand, are more likely
to succeed by placing the anti-immigration detention agenda within the scope of larger criminal
legal reform than by pursuing immigration detention reform or through litigation.

* Thank you to Clare Ryan, Ben Levin, Anthony Casey, and Aziz Huq, for very helpful comments
and critiques of this paper and especially to Jenn Scott and Danielle Grote for help in fleshing out these
ideas. All errors are mine.
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INTRODUCTION
Throughout the late spring and early summer of 2020, as the COVID-191
pandemic spread across the United States, litigants throughout the nation filed
hundreds of lawsuits challenging the conditions of confinement at both the federal
and state level. According to data gathered by The Bronx Defenders, a legal services
provider in New York City, almost 400 lawsuits were filed in federal courts all
around the country between April 2020 and the end of July that same year, seeking
the release of thousands of individuals in state and federal custody as well as in
immigration detention.2 Out of these, eighty-three lawsuits were focused on
immigration detainees. Each claim was different, of course, but all of them sought
the immediate release of individuals detained due to heightened health risks caused
by being incarcerated during the COVID-19 pandemic.3
These lawsuits were grounded in a mix of claims, from failures to comply with
the Administrative Procedure Act and/or the Immigration and Nationality Act
(“INA”) to purported constitutional violations. Most of them, however, focused on
assertions of Fifth Amendment due process violations.
Most courts ruled against plaintiffs. Yet, in eleven cases, litigants succeeded in
obtaining temporary restraining orders and/or preliminary injunctions against the
federal government ensuring the release of individuals confined in immigration
detention.4 It is important to note that, in all these cases, judges went out of their
way to assert the exceptionality of the circumstances and outcome. In a typical
1. COVID-19 is the disease caused by the coronavirus—SARS-CoV-2—a virus that emerged
in China in December of 2019. Throughout this article I will be referring to “the coronavirus” when
referring to the virus and “COVID-19” when referring to the disease.
2. See COVID-19 Litigation Database, BRONX DEFS., https://www.bronxdefenders.org/
covid-19-litigation/ [ https://perma.cc/GA7N-WJGW ] ( last visited July 13, 2022 ).
3. Jails and prisons are generally at grave risk for the transmission of infection of COVID-19
due to their inherent structure and mission. See, e.g., Nicole Wetsman, Prisons and Jails Are Vulnerable
to COVID-19 Outbreaks, VERGE (Mar. 7, 2020, 8:30 AM ), https://www.theverge.com/2020/3/7/
21167807/coronavirus-prison-jail-health-outbreak-covid-19-flu-soap [ https://perma.cc/QE5D-5V46 ].
4. As a disclaimer, the LSU Immigration Law Clinic, where I work, assisted in some of these
cases with interviewing plaintiffs. The Clinic, however, did not represent any of these plaintiffs in court.
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example, Kevin McNulty, U.S. District Judge in New Jersey, stated that “[t]his
decision should not be taken as signifying a result in any other individual case;
rather, it is a reflection of the unique circumstances present in this particular case.”5
These cases confirmed that the judiciary will be deferential to the executive
branch in immigration matters.6 As reviewed in more depth in Part I, courts that
summer were, for the most part,7 resolving constitutional due process challenges by
analyzing whether detention was “reasonably related to a legitimate governmental
objective.”8 This analysis requires a balance of the equities between the purpose of
detention—namely, avoiding flight risk and/or danger to the community—and the
threat to an individual’s life given continued detention in the midst of a global
pandemic. Given that, as explored in Part IV, immigration detention is unnecessary
to achieve the goals of administrative efficiency it purports to achieve,9 it is difficult
to see how these objectives would win the day over real threats to people’s lives.10
However, even in these circumstances, courts were incredibly hesitant to grant
release from detention and only did so when the individuals were at tremendous
risk because of their particular health conditions.11 These cases reflect the extent to

5. Juan E.M. v. Decker, 458 F. Supp. 3d 244, 247–48 (D.N.J. 2020 ). Judge McNulty repeated
the same statement in Leandro R.P. v. Decker, 455 F. Supp. 3d 85, 89 ( D.N.J. 2020 ).
6. See infra Part I.
7. Some courts applied other tests like the deliberate indifference standard. See, e.g., Coronel
v. Decker, 449 F. Supp. 3d 274, 282 ( S.D.N.Y. 2020 ).
8. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 539 (1979 ).
9. As argued infra Part I, over eighty-five percent of immigrants in non-detained removal
proceedings attend their hearings, and there is no evidence showing that subjecting people to detention
makes people safer. Ingrid Eagly, Steven Shafer, and Jana Whalley, Detaining Families: A Study of
Asylum Adjudication in Family Detention, 106 Cal. L. Rev. 785 (2018 ). See also , Thomas J. Miles
& Adam B. Cox, Does Immigration Enforcement Reduce Crime? Evidence from Secure Communities,
57 J.L. & ECON. 937 ( 2014 ) ( finding no empirical connection between the program Secure
Communities and crime reduction ).
10. It is difficult to overstate the coronavirus’s threat on public health. In the first half of 2020,
the virus infected ten million people around the world and killed about half a million people. See Ed
Yong, How the Pandemic Defeated America, ATL. ( Aug. 4, 2020, 1:12 PM ), https://www.theatlantic.com/
magazine/archive/2020/09/coronavirus-american-failure/614191/ [ https://perma.cc/WML9-7TR4 ].
The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention ( CDC ) has found that custodial institutions present
“unique challenges for control of SARS-CoV-2 transmission”. Guidance for Correctional and Detention
Facilities, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019ncov/community/correction-detention/guidance-correctional-detention.html [ https://web.archive.org/
web/20200722013044/https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/community/correction-detention/
guidance-correctional-detention.html ] ( last visited July 22, 2020 ). “Nationwide the known infection
rate for Covid-19 in jails and prisons is about 2.5 times higher than the general population.”
Covid-19’s Impact on People in Prison, EQUAL JUST. INITIATIVE ( May 21, 2020 ), https://eji.org/news/
covid-19s-impact-on-people-in-prison/ [ https://web.archive.org/web/20200522152131/https://eji.org/
news/covid-19s-impact-on-people-in-prison/ ].
11. The CDC has found that “certain underlying medical conditions” place individuals
at “increased risk of severe illness from COVID-19.” People with Certain Medical Conditions,
CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/
need-extra-precautions/people-with-medical-conditions.html
[ https://web.archive.org/web/20200730002440/https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/
need-extra-precautions/people-with-medical-conditions.html ] ( last visited July 30, 2020 ).
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which courts have given carte blanche to the federal government in administering
immigration law and policy.12 In terms of detention in particular, notwithstanding
an initial win for detainees in 2001,13 the Supreme Court has essentially validated a
regime that allows for continuous indefinite detention.14
Beyond detention, legal scholars have concluded that—to use a borrowed
phrase—immigration is exceptional.15 This is especially true for issues that have to
do with constitutional rights. The executive branch of government is given
tremendous deference and, following the plenary power doctrine, which protects
the federal government from claims that it is violating an individual’s constitutional
right to equal protection when it imposes discriminatory burdens on non-U.S.
citizens, the scope of judicial review in immigration matters has been fairly limited.16
If courts indeed offer such a constrained path for relief, the question
remains: what should strategic efforts aiming to curtail detention look like?
One option is to push for reform that changes the grounds and conditions for
detention. However, given the vexed politics of immigration policy, it is unlikely
that such a focus would be fruitful.17 Moreover, as I discuss in Part II, the growth
in immigration detention is largely thanks to a phenomenon rooted in the ways in
which the law is implemented, rather than what it says. To that end, unless
immigration detention is made fully unlawful, or numerically constrained, reform is
unlikely to provide long-standing relief. In this Article, I argue that rather than
focusing on immigration law as it exists on the books, or even on the ground,18
advocates should attempt to fold efforts to reform immigration detention within
efforts to end carceral exceptionalism in the United States.

12. This trend has continued. Just in this term, the Supreme Court held that federal courts lack
jurisdiction to review even clearly erroneous findings of fact in discretionary immigration relief cases.
This position was so extreme that neither DHS nor the DOJ advocated for it ( the case was argued by
an amicus attorney assigned by the Court ). See Patel v. Garland, 142 S. Ct. 1614 (2022 ).
13. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 701 ( 2001 ) ( holding that if an individual is not removed
six months after an order has been issued then they can seek release ).
14. See Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 531 ( 2003 ) ( holding that prolonged detention while in
removal proceedings is constitutional ); see also Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830, 847–48 ( 2018 )
( holding that respondents are not entitled to periodic bond hearings ).
15. David S. Rubenstein & Pratheepan Gulasekaram, Immigration Exceptionalism, 111
NW. U. L.R. 583 (2017 ).
16. See Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law After a Century of Plenary Power: Phantom
Constitutional Norms and Statutory Interpretation, 100 YALE L.J. 545 ( 1990 ).
17. See, e.g., Claire Felter, Danielle Renwick & Amelia Cheatham, The U.S. Immigration Debate,
COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS ( Aug. 31, 2021, 8:00 AM ), https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/
us-immigration-debate-0 [ https://perma.cc/2CP2-4WDB]( discussing the political impasse around
immigration policy since the George W. Bush presidency and the move to a more exclusively executive
arena ); see also Adam B. Cox & Cristina M. Rodríguez, The President and Immigration Law, 119 YALE
L.J. 458 ( 2009 ) ( discussing the legal history of executive involvement in immigration matters ).
18. After all, many of the outcomes in immigration have to do with how government actors
execute the broad discretion that they are given. See, e.g., Adam B. Cox & Cristina M. Rodríguez, The
President and Immigration Law Redux, 125 YALE L.J. 104 (2015 ) ( showing that historically and legally
the Executive has very few constraints with regards to how immigration law is enforced ).
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Throughout the past ten years, all across the country, there has been a growing
interest and legislative focus on ending mass incarceration and overcriminalization.19
This is happening on top of an already dropping prison population.20 While it is true
that the extent of bipartisan consensus on criminal legal reform is much more
limited than commonly assumed21—which significantly narrows the scope and
reach of reform22—the current growth in immigration detention is at odds with the
sweeping changes being sought.23

19. See generally infra Part II.
20. While this drop is still not enough to bring the country level with the rest of the world, let
alone other liberal democracies, the U.S. prison population has fallen by about 200 thousand people
since its peak at above 2.3 million in 2008. See ROY WALMSLEY, INST. FOR CRIM. POL’Y RSCH., WORLD
PRISON POPULATION LIST ( 12th ed. 2018 ), https://www.prisonstudies.org/sites/default/files/
resources/downloads/wppl_12.pdf [ https://perma.cc/7CGH-J5X8 ]. Some data from 2021 has
shown a slight growth in prison population, however there is not enough evidence to suggest that this
marks a new trend rather than a deviation caused in part by the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic.
See, e.g., Mikaela Meyer, Ahmed Hassafy, Gina Lewis, Prasun Shrestha, Amelia M. Haviland & Daniel
S. Nagin, Changes in Crime Rates During the COVID-19 Pandemic, 9 STATS. & PUB. POL’Y, no. 1, 2022,
at 97 ( finding that crime rates varied according to type of offense as well as the type of policy response
to the COVID-19 pandemic in a particular locality ); Christopher Stone, Progressive Prosecutors
and Public Safety: Success Even During the 2020 Rise in Violent Crime, U. OF OXFORD: VOICES
( Jan. 31, 2022 ), https://www.bsg.ox.ac.uk/blog/progressive-prosecutors-and-public-safety-successeven-during-2020-rise-violent-crime [ https://perma.cc/YVX7-C6HS ] ( suggesting crime in cities with
more liberal criminal prosecution policies has fallen ).
21. See, e.g., Benjamin Levin, The Consensus Myth in Criminal Justice Reform, 117 MICH. L. REV. 259
( 2018 ) ( showing that the idea of consensus around criminal justice reform is derived from conceptual
indeterminacy or confusion around what is meant by criminal justice reform in both what problem it is
trying to solve and the mechanism to do that ); see also MARIE GOTTSCHALK, CAUGHT: THE PRISON
STATE AND THE LOCKDOWN OF AMERICAN POLITICS ( 2015 ) ( criticizing conservative efforts and
justifications of criminal justice reform and finding them incompatible with the approaches and/or
critique coming from the left ).
22. That these reforms are not as far-ranging and are unlikely to bring incarceration rates in the
United States in line with the rest of the world is fairly uncontroversial. See John Pfaff, Decarceration’s
Blindspots, 16 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 253 ( 2019 ); Carl Takei, From Mass Incarceration to Mass Control,
and Back Again: How Bipartisan Criminal Justice Reform May Lead to a For-Profit Nightmare, 20
U. PA. J.L. & SOC. CHANGE 125, 126–27 ( 2017 ); Nicola Lacey, Humanizing the Criminal Justice
Machine: Re-Animated Justice or Frankenstein’s Monster?, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1299, 1299 ( 2013 )
( reviewing STEPHANOS BIBAS, THE MACHINERY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE ( 2012 ) ) ( explaining that
technocratic policy reform in criminal law is unlikely to fully address the problems that are sought to
be solved ). More generally, in the popular press many of these laws have been criticized. See, e.g., Justin
George, Is the “First Step Act” Real Reform?, MARSHALL PROJECT ( May 22, 2018, 8:53 PM ), https://
www.themarshallproject.org/2018/05/22/is-the-first-step-act-real-reform [ https://perma.cc/Q55EBNWL]; Roger Lancaster, The Carceral Problem Is Getting Worse, JACOBIN ( Dec. 30, 2018 ), https://
www.jacobinmag.com/2018/12/criminal-justice-reform-first-step-act [ https://perma.cc/6UFN-3XTY].
23. Since 1994, the use of immigration detention has increased going from an average daily
population of 6,785 that year to a little over 40,000 at the beginning of 2020. Unless otherwise
noted, data of the number of people in immigration detention is drawn from two Immigration and
Customs Enforcement databases that stop in January 2020. A copy of the integrated databases is
available upon request. They can be found at ICE Detention Facilities as of November 2017, NAT’L
IMMIGRANT JUST. CTR., https://www.immigrantjustice.org/ice-detention-facilities-november-2017
[ https://perma.cc/3SDD-KKT5 ] ( last visited July 14, 2022 ); Detention Management, U.S. IMMIGR. &
CUSTOMS ENF’T, https://www.ice.gov/detention-management [ https://web.archive.org/web/
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Advocates seeking to end immigration detention should take advantage of
this movement and present immigration detention as part of the carceral state.
Despite the fact that courts have long recognized a distinction between criminal
and civil confinement,24 that incarceration and immigration detention should
be understood in tandem is evident when they are analyzed through the framework
of the “total institution.” As explained further infra, a total institution is one
which serves effectively as a “barrier to social intercourse with the outside.”25 This
concept has been used to show that mental health asylums and incarceration are
one large project of confinement.26 Similarly,27 both in geography and purpose,
immigration detention is also a total institution. Most detention centers are actually
jails or prisons where detainees are subjected to similar schedules, meals, and
administrative and punishment regimes (including solitary confinement) as
inmates.28 Also, immigration detention is justified—at least in part—to protect the
community from the perceived threat of the persons housed within.29 Furthermore,
just like in jails and prisons, confinement in immigration detention centers is
20200225141011/https://www.ice.gov/detention-management ] ( last visited Feb. 25, 2020 ) ( although
the ICE database is updated monthly, this paper only looks at data ending in January of 2020 ).
24. See, e.g., Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 99 ( 1997 ) (“Whether a particular punishment
is criminal or civil is, at least initially, a matter of statutory construction. A court must first ask whether
the legislature, ‘in establishing the penalizing mechanism, indicated either expressly or impliedly a
preference for one label or the other.’” ( first citing Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 399 ( 1938 ); and
then quoting United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 248 ( 1980 ) ) ); Scott v. Moore, 114 F.3d 51, 53 ( 5th
Cir. 1997 ) ( finding that civil detention becomes unconstitutional when it is “not [ or no longer ]
reasonably related to a legitimate, non-punitive governmental objective.” ( quoting Hare v. City of
Corinth, 74 F.3d 633, 640 ( 5th Cir. 1996 ) ) ) ).
25. Erving Goffman, The Characteristics of Total Institutions, in SYMPOSIUM ON PREVENTIVE
AND SOCIAL PSYCHIATRY 43, 43–44 ( Nat’l Rsch. Council 1958 ).
26.
See Bernard E. Harcourt, From the Asylum to the Prison: Rethinking the Incarceration
Revolution, 84 TEX. L. REV. 1751 (2006 ); Sacha Raoult & Bernard E. Harcourt, The Mirror Image of
Asylums and Prisons: A Study of Institutionalization Trends in France ( 1850–2010 ), 19 PUNISHMENT
& SOC’Y 155 (2017 ) ( finding that trends of institutionalization in asylums and prisons in France have
“mirrored” each other in the last 150 years, maintaining “total institutionalization” constant ).
27. As addressed infra Section III.A, Harcourt argues that the same populations are being
confined in different institutions; the argument here is rather that actors will confine a new population
to ensure institutional continuity.
28. See Jennifer M. Chacón, Privatized Immigration Enforcement, 52 HARV.CIV.RTS.-CIV.LIBERTIES
L. REV. 1, 22–24, 35 n.175 ( 2017 ); César Cuauhtémoc García Hernández, Immigration Detention as
Punishment, 61 UCLA L. REV. 1346 ( 2014 ); René Lima-Marín & Danielle C. Jefferis, It’s Just Like
Prison: Is a Civil (Nonpunitive) System of Immigration Detention Theoretically Possible?, 96
DENV. L. REV. 955, 964–65 ( 2019 ) ( describing the similarity between both immigration detention and
prison, and the ways in which immigration detention is more punitive than prison ).
29. Under section 236 of the Immigration and Nationality Act ( INA ), an immigration judge is
allowed to deny release on bond if she deems that the noncitizen “will not pose a danger to the safety
of other persons or of property.” Immigration and Nationality Act § 236, 8 U.S.C. § 1226( c )( 2 ). The
Supreme Court has also justified detention under these terms. Furthermore, as discussed infra Part II,
that much of the apparatus is constructed under a racialized notion that views immigrants as the
problem is obvious to many. See, e.g., César Cuauhtémoc García Hernández, Abolishing Immigration
Prisons, 97 B.U. L. REV. 245 ( 2017 ); Alina Das, Immigration Detention: Information Gaps and
Institutional Barriers to Reform, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 137, 148 (2013 ). However, one need not believe that
claim in order to recognize that detention is used to address a problem, whatever problem that may be.
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government-mandated and compulsory. Moreover, as César Cuauhtémoc García
Hernández has argued, the ramping up of both incarceration and immigration
detention served the same legislative intent of fighting the war on drugs.30 Finally,
whether legally through the merger of criminal and immigration (“crimmigration”)
systems or practically by several facilities housing both inmates and detainees, the
immigration detention and incarceration systems are already operating as a singular
institution, rather than two of the same type.31 Therefore, a rising number of
immigrant detainees is incompatible with decarceration efforts.
Moreover, much of criminal legal reform is not fully congruous with
expanding the use of immigration detention. After all, regardless of how it is
justified, a specific objective of criminal legal reform is to reduce the prison
population.32 That is, whether articulated through the prism of law and economics
or critical legal analysis, there is a consensus that incarceration should be used more
sparingly.33 I do not mean to imply that all reform in this area is premised on a
rejection of the moral legitimacy of prisons as a whole,34 but rather that the goal of
reducing prison populations is a common denominator regardless of the normative
impetus for criminal legal reform.

30. García Hernández, supra note 28, at 1361.
31. See generally César Cuauhtémoc García Hernández, Creating Crimmigration, 2013 BYU
L. REV. 1457 ( detailing how and to what extent criminal and immigration systems have merged
through expansion of immigration consequences for criminal activity, militarization of police control,
criminalization of migration, and relaxation of criminal procedure standards for immigration-related
crimes ). See also Ingrid V. Eagly, Criminal Justice in an Era of Mass Deportation: Reforms from California,
20 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 12, 25–35 ( 2017 ) ( proposing a path forward for states looking to minimize the
impacts of crimmigration ).
32. The push for criminal justice reform has transcended the traditional left/right divide and,
consequently, is justified in various ways. Advocates often point to, for example, budget pressures,
normative excesses, increased tension between police and communities, lack of future opportunities
for employment for incarcerated individuals, and prisons being breeding grounds for more criminals.
See, e.g., Jeremiah Mosteller, Why Prison Reform Matters in America, CHARLES KOCH INST. ( June 22,
2018 ), https://charleskochinstitute.org/stories/why-prison-reform-matters-in-america/ [ https://
perma.cc/L4D4-U6DD]; End Mass Incarceration, B RENNAN C TR . FOR J UST ., https://
www.brennancenter.org/issues/end-mass-incarceration [ https://perma.cc/FM5X-BJX3 ] ( last visited
July 14, 2022 ).
33. Political efforts to cut incarceration openly recognize that the use of imprisonment in the
United States should be reduced. See, e.g., Who We Are, D REAM C ORPS J UST., https://
www.thedreamcorps.org/our-programs/justice/about/ [ https://perma.cc/8WLB-TPG8 ] ( last visited
July 14, 2022 ) (a bipartisan commitment prison reform coalition that sought to reduce incarceration
levels by half in the country ).
34. There are many reasons to question the moral legitimacy of locking people in cages in
general. See, e.g., Allegra M. McLeod, Prison Abolition and Grounded Justice, 62 UCLA L. REV. 1156,
1161 (2015 ) ( introducing an “abolitionist framework” for analyzing criminal law and policy ). However,
the point being advanced here is much more limited: measures that promote expanding imprisonment,
whether civil or penal, are incompatible with criminal law reform that seeks to decrease the reliance
on imprisonment. Dorothy E. Roberts, The Supreme Court, 2018 Term—Forward: Abolition
Constitutionalism, 133 HARV. L. REV. 1, 110–17 (2019 ) ( providing a framework for grounding prison
abolition in the Constitution ); MARIAME KABA, WE DO THIS ‘TIL WE FREE US: ABOLITIONIST
ORGANIZING AND TRANSFORMING JUSTICE 27 ( Tamara K. Nopper ed., 2021 ) (introducing general
audiences to the idea that prisons are not necessary nor useful to address or prevent social harm ).
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That localities will turn to immigration detention to keep their jails or prisons
open becomes evident when we consider that the carceral state is an extremely
“resilient, flexible, and enabling institution that can resist, incorporate, redefine, and
absorb critical discourse.”35 Given the number of vested interests that currently
exist in the prison industry,36 it is possible that pressure to expand immigration
detention will begin to build especially if opposition to criminal incarceration
becomes more successful. Furthermore, we cannot underestimate the economic
impact that decarceration can have in localities that depend on jails for employment.37
As such, current analyses suggest that decarceration can be a factor in increased
immigration detention at the local level.38
Understanding immigration detention as part and parcel of the capacity of
confinement highlights the limitations to decarceration approaches that focus solely
on criminal law. This is not only because these approaches ignore a large number
of confined individuals, but also because efforts to push for decarceration that do
not consider immigration detention, and/or the economic impacts of decarceration,
may lead to growth in alternative measures of confinement. In this way, ending, or
seriously curtailing, immigration detention should become paramount for advocates
of criminal legal reform as well. On the flip side, immigration advocates looking for
strategic efforts to end detention are more likely to succeed by taking advantage of
the growing decarceration movement and presenting immigration detention as a
part of it.
Part I outlines the history of immigration detention, discusses the very narrow
legal grounds for challenging detention, and explains the limited success of this
strategy as a result of a broader judicial understanding of immigration law. Part II
briefly describes the rise in immigration detention and explains that it is a result of
law on the ground rather than law on the books. Part III argues that the relationship
between immigration and criminal confinement is likely to grow; a trend consistent
with the rise of crimmigration generally. Finally, Part IV outlines the reasons why
advocates for criminal legal reform and immigration reform should work together
to achieve the common goal of reducing the use of confinement as a policy tool.
Namely, normative concerns around both types of confinement are the same,
meaning that advocates of ending or reducing carceral populations should also be

35. GOTTSCHALK, supra note 21, at 14. See generally KELLY HANNAH-MOFFAT, PUNISHMENT
IN DISGUISE: PENAL GOVERNANCE AND FEDERAL IMPRISONMENT OF WOMEN IN CANADA ( 2001 ).
36. See GOTTSCHALK, supra note 21, at 15 ( arguing that criminal law reform is unlikely in the
face of the “tenacity of neoliberalism in American politics” ).
37. Tim Arango, ‘Nothing Will Be the Same’: A Prison Town Weighs a Future Without a Prison,
N.Y. TIMES ( Jan. 12, 2022 ), https://www.nytimes.com/2022/01/10/us/susanville-california-prisonclosing.html [ https://perma.cc/Z5UU-9WSH ] ( detailing the struggles faced by small rural towns
where jails will be closed ).
38. See Emily Ryo & Ian Peacock, Jailing Immigrant Detainees: A National Study of County
Participation in Immigration Detention, 1983–2013, 54 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 66, 91 (2020 ) (arguing that
relative ﬂuctuations in the local criminal inmate population seem to be indicative of levels of
immigration detention ).
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concerned about detention. Moreover, immigration advocates are severely limited
in both legal and political terms. Strategically, it may be advantageous for
immigration reform advocates to join the decarceration movement to overcome
both constraints.
I. LITIGATING AGAINST IMMIGRATION DETENTION: AN UPHILL BATTLE
Immigration detention is somewhat of a “historical anomaly.”39 When it was
first used, around the time of the passage of the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882,
detention was used for short periods of time.40 For much of the twentieth century,
immigration detention remained as an exceptional measure, so much so that in 1980
only 4,062 people were detained per day.41 However, throughout the 1990s and into
the twenty-first century, immigration detention skyrocketed, reaching almost 52,000
in 2019,42 and leveling off at around 38,000 in early 202043 before the coronavirus
pandemic essentially shut the border (and thus the influx of migrants to jails).44 In
this Part, I explain how this shift has been a result of legal reforms and, moreover,
how these reforms have been implemented.
Given the short history of the sustained and systematic use of immigration
detention, it is not surprising that there is a less extensive jurisprudence analyzing
the constitutionality of detention regimes and practices in comparison to criminal
incarceration.45 Even today, when the number of people in immigration detention
39. Aaron Korthuis, Detention and Deterrence: Insights from the Early Years of Immigration
Detention at the Border, 129 YALE L.J.F. 238, 239 ( 2019 ).
40. See Robert Barde & Gustavo J. Bobonis, Detention at Angel Island: First Empirical Evidence,
30 SOC. SCI. HIST. 103, 113 ( 2006 ) (finding that detention periods at Angel Island lasted ten nights on
average ). See also ERIKA LEE & JUDY YUNG, ANGEL ISLAND: IMMIGRANT GATEWAY TO AMERICA 8
( 2010 ) ( claiming that immigrants were mostly detained at Ellis Island for hours and only in extreme
cases for a few days ).
41. García Hernández, supra note 28, at 1466.
42. Hamed Aleaziz, More than 52,000 People Are Now Being Detained by ICE, an Apparent
All-Time High, BUZZFEED NEWS (May 20, 2019, 3:58 PM ), https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/
hamedaleaziz/ice-detention-record-immigrants-border [ https://perma.cc/Z48X-AD6F].
43. See CÉSAR CUAUHTÉMOC GARCÍA HERNÁNDEZ, MIGRATING TO PRISON: AMERICA’S
OBSESSION WITH LOCKING UP IMMIGRANTS 60, 72 ( 2019 ) ( arguing that the United States has
implemented a border-to-prison pipeline ).
44. Since March 2020 and up until the day of this writing, the land border in the United States
has been shut down to asylum seekers under 42 U.S.C. § 265, which allows the CDC to “prohibit . . . the
introduction” of individuals when “there is a serious danger of the introduction of [ a communicable]
disease into the United States.” See 42 U.S.C. § 265. This has artificially depressed the number
of asylum seekers, thus temporarily reducing the number of detainees. Given that this is the result
of a temporary policy rather than a shift in immigration enforcement writ large, the analysis of
this paper will focus on immigration policy and enforcement before the COVID-19 pandemic. See
AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL, A GUIDE TO TITLE 42 EXPULSIONS AT THE BORDER ( 2022 ), https://
www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/sites/default/files/research/title_42_expulsions_at_the_border_0.pdf
[ https://perma.cc/USZ3-MT2R ].
45. Just for the sake of comparison, criminal legal scholarship has produced histories spanning
over 100 years of how courts have understood the notion of criminal due process, see, e.g., WILLIAM
J. STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE ( 2011 ); Michael Willrich, Criminal
Justice in the United States, in 3 THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF LAW IN AMERICA 195, 198 ( Michael
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has drastically increased, the average length of detention is fifty-five days,46 which
is generally not enough time to bring about a claim regarding the legality or the
conditions of detention without the issue becoming moot. This by no means
suggests that there are no cases where detention is sufficiently prolonged to allow
for litigation to arise and continue, but simply that the universe of possible cases
that can be used to advance the law is relatively narrow.
Considering this, it should perhaps be unsurprising that the Supreme Court
has handed down only four major decisions regarding the constitutionality of
immigration detention in the last thirty years.47 In 2001, the Court held in Zadvydas
v. Davis that there is a constitutional limit on the length of time a detainee with a
removal order can be confined beyond the 90-day period within which immigration
officials must execute that removal order.48 In the wake of the September 11 attacks,
and, therefore, in a considerably different context, the Court validated the
constitutionality of unlimited detention while an individual is in removal
proceedings in Demore v. Kim.49 In 2005, the Court extended Zadvydas to apply to
noncitizens apprehended at entry.50 Most recently, in Jennings v. Rodriguez, the Court
held that U.S. law does not grant detained individuals the right to periodic bond
hearings during the course of their detention.51
In all these cases, the Court emphasized that there is a difference between
immigration detention, which is civil in nature, and criminal incarceration, which is
punitive.52 This distinction has given the Supreme Court a jurisdictional hook
Grossberg & Christopher Tomlins eds., 2008 ), and—accordingly—critical responses to these histories,
see, e.g., Sarah A. Seo, Democratic Policing Before the Due Process Revolution, 128 YALE L.J. 1246, 1246
( 2019 ) (arguing that there was no such thing as a due process revolution under the Warren Court ).
46. AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL, IMMIGRATION DETENTION IN THE UNITED STATES BY
AGENCY 4 ( 2020 ), https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/sites/default/files/research/
immigration_detention_in_the_united_states_by_agency.pdf [ https://perma.cc/36JH-VS32 ].
47. As Hiroshi Motomura has written, very “little constitutional immigration law has ever taken
root.” Hiroshi Motomura, The Curious Evolution of Immigration Law: Procedural Surrogates for
Substantive Constitutional Rights, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1625, 1626 ( 1992 ). At the time of this writing,
the Supreme Court had heard oral arguments, but had not yet released opinions, on two cases
addressing questions of immigration detention. These cases have now been decided. First, Johnson
v. Arteaga-Martinez, which held that the INA does not require bond hearings before immigration judges
after six months of detention in which the Government bears the burden of proving by clear and
convincing evidence that a noncitizen poses a flight risk or a danger to the community. Johnson
v. Arteaga-Martinez, 142 S. Ct. 1827 ( 2022 ). Second, Garland v. Aleman Gonzalez, which held that the
INA deprived federal court jurisdiction to entertain noncitizens’ requests for classwide injunctive relief.
Garland v. Aleman Gonzalez, 142 S. Ct. 2057 ( 2022 ). The conclusions in both cases further narrowed
access to relief from detainees and therefore do not detract from the overall argument made here. If
anything, they lend support to it.
48. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S 678, 699–701 ( 2001 ).
49. Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 531 ( 2003 ).
50. Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 385–86 ( 2005 ).
51. Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830, 847–48. As discussed above, the recent decision in
Arteaga-Martinez also held that individuals with a removal order that are seeking withholding of
removal are not entitled to a bond hearing before an immigration judge. See Arteaga-Martinez, 142
S. Ct. 1827.
52. See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690; Clark, 543 U.S. at 380; Jennings, 138 S. Ct. at 865.

Second to Printer_Gerson.docx (Do Not Delete)

2022 ]

EMBRACING CRIMMIGRATION

9/29/2022 9:02 PM

1219

to invoke due process protections under the Fifth Amendment of the
U.S. Constitution when immigration detention becomes problematic (rather than
an Eighth Amendment analysis). In Zadvydas, for example, prolonged detention
after a removal order was pending was held unconstitutional because proceedings
were “civil, not criminal . . . [and therefore] nonpunitive in purpose and effect.”53
There was no justification for long detention to administer the statute, because the
Court had validated immigration detention only as a means of administrative
efficiency. For the class of people covered by Zadvydas, there was no need to
continue detaining people longer than six months because by then their detention
was not serving the goal of removal.54
My aim in this Part is not to criticize the Court for this reasoning. As many
have pointed out, arguing that immigration detention exists solely for civil purposes
ignores the fact that public officials have explicitly articulated that detention is a
means of deterring further immigration.55 Confining people for deterrence
purposes is seen as a method of criminal, not administrative, law. Therefore, if
immigration detention is premised on this goal, then it should be unconstitutional.
However, courts will not rule this way as long as the government is able to articulate
a reasonable justification for detention as it pertains to administrative efficiency.
Furthermore, I am not suggesting that all the issues around the constitutionality of
prolonged immigration detention have been settled. Notably, Jennings skirted the
thorniest constitutional issue, which is whether the INA’s validation of indefinite
detention of noncitizens without a bond hearing is constitutional.56 Rather, I am
pointing to these cases to suggest that the opportunities to vindicate immigrant
rights through litigation are seriously constrained. As David Rubenstein and
Pratheepan Gulasekaram have argued,
[S]ubstantive constitutional rights—such as equal protection, due process,
freedom of association, and so on—tend to garner less judicial scrutiny in
immigration cases than other areas of federal regulation . . . . [R]ights
challenges to the federal political branches’ immigration decisions generally
swim upstream against the plenary power doctrine and its vestiges.57
The Supreme Court’s due process analysis is consistent with how the Court
has generally viewed the executive branch’s authority over immigration law. As Cox
53. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690.
54. A key in understanding Zadvydas is that it is a case about people with post-final removal
orders that, for one reason or another, the government cannot deport. See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701.
The Court reasoned that the government needed some time to carry out this process and six months
was ample time to do it. Id. Detention after that would no longer serve the purpose of securing removal
because it was clear that the government would not be able to effectuate removal soon. Id. Therefore,
continued detention at that point became punitive. See Scott v. Moore, 114 F.3d 51, 53 ( 5th Cir. 1997 ).
55. See Emily Ryo, Detention as Deterrence, 71 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 237, 238–40 ( 2019 ).
56. See Jennings, 138 S. Ct. at 851–52.
57. Rubenstein & Gulasekaram, supra note 15, at 595–97; see also Danielle C. Jefferis,
Constitutionally Unaccountable: Privatized Immigration Detention, 95 IND. L.J. 145, 168–73 ( showing
the even more narrow avenues for vindication of constitutional rights for immigrants detained in
private prisons ).
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and Rodriguez have shown, the history of U.S. immigration law in the twentieth
century is one of an ever-expanding use of powers “expressly delegated to [the
President] by Congress to advance his own immigration agenda.”58 Moreover, the
Supreme Court itself has found that the executive branch has broad power and
authority over immigration.59 The many losses for the Trump administration
notwithstanding,60 the executive branch of government has generally prevailed in
imposing its desired immigration policy.61
The recent experiences of many litigants around the country challenging the
continued detention of individuals in the midst of the COVID-19 pandemic shows
just how complicated it is to vindicate immigrant detainees’ rights through the
courts. The Bronx Defenders, a legal services provider, gathered data on all
litigation around detention conditions throughout the pandemic.62 Reviewing the
immigration detention cases, I found that in most of these cases,63 district courts
have been tremendously deferential to the federal government in its continued
rationale for the detention of immigrants.
Even in cases where courts granted relief in the form of release from
detention, judges made it explicitly clear that the decisions did not question the
validity of detention as a means of administrative adjudication, nor were they a
wholesale rejection of the appropriateness of confining individuals for these
purposes, even amidst a pandemic that threatened their livelihood. Rather, in
case after case, judges emphasized that very specific factors were responsible
for meriting relief. As a judge in California found, “the Court has not seen[] a
case finding that increased likelihood of contracting the virus rendered
unconstitutional the detention of a person without underlying medical conditions
or some other vulnerability.”64
It is worth noting that the COVID-19 cases involved intensive fact-finding
and the conclusions seem to be more a result of these facts found than the law. A
58. Cox & Rodríguez, supra note 18, at 116.
59. See United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 543 ( 1950 ).
60. Those losses were more a product of sloppy process than of law. Most notably in the recent
case Department of Homeland Security v. Regents of the University of California, reviewing the Deferred
Action for Childhood Arrivals program, the Trump administration lost because it did not follow the
APA in rescinding DACA not because the recission was unlawful. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Regents
of the Univ. of Cal., 140 S. Ct. 1891, 1915 ( 2020 ).
61. This is not to say that the Court closes all doors to litigants in favor of the government.
Despite handing down a defeat to immigrants in Jennings v. Rodriguez, for example, the Court found
no jurisdictional bars to appellants challenging either the conditions or the framework allowing for
confinement prior to the determination of removal, contradicting a strict textual interpretation of the
INA. Jennings, 138 S. Ct. at 839–840.
62. See BRONX DEFS., supra note 2.
63. I am not arguing that the government won most cases ( although they did win fifty-four
percent of them ). See id. Rather, whether they won or not, courts treated the practice of immigration
detention as presumptively justified.
64. Martinez Franco v. Jennings, 456 F. Supp. 3d 1193, 1199 ( N.D. Cal. 2020 ); see also Riggs
v. Louisiana, No. 20-0495, 2020 WL 1939168, at *2 (W.D. La. Apr. 22, 2020 ) ( finding that “prisoners
are not entitled to release or transfer based solely on generalized COVID-19 fears and speculation” ).
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review of the cases revealed that courts have applied different standards to review
plaintiffs’ constitutional arguments, but the discrepancy in results cannot be
attributed to this legal analysis.65 Instead the outcomes have been driven by courts
painstakingly addressing the facts that led them either to grant or deny motions
for release.
Most cases have been decided by an analysis of a range of factors. Accordingly,
courts have developed multi-factored tests to determine whether continued
detention was warranted.66 A court in Louisiana, for example, found it relevant:
(1) whether the petitioner has been diagnosed with COVID-19 or is
experiencing symptoms consistent with the disease; (2) whether the
petitioner is among the group of individuals that is at higher risk of
contracting COVID-19 as identified by the CDC . . . ; (3) whether the
petitioner has been directly exposed to COVID-19; (4) [the ability to
practice social distancing in] the physical space in which the petitioner is
detained . . . ; (5) the efforts that detention facility officials have made
to . . . mitigate the spread of [the virus] . . . ; (6) any danger to the
community, or to the petitioner’s immigration proceedings, that may be
posed by the petitioner’s release; and (7) any other relevant factors.67
These fact-based conclusions have led to different outcomes in remarkably
similar cases, and even in the same lawsuits. In Dada v. Witte, a case in Louisiana,
the court released thirteen out of sixteen plaintiffs because one of the plaintiffs
contracted COVID-19 while the suit played out (so was assumed to be at low risk
of reinfection), while the remaining two were held in a facility with no reported
COVID-19 cases.68
Lists like the one above are not atypical.69 They reflect a hesitancy from courts
to upend the aforementioned, long-standing view that federal enforcement of
immigration laws is generally constitutional. Beyond that however, the lists serve as
a way to understand how courts have analyzed the issue of release. On the one hand,
factors one through five show a concern with how much a plaintiff is at risk of
contracting COVID-19, and if they contract it, whether or not their life is at risk.
On the other hand, factor six, which is also the inquiry carried out by immigration
bond proceedings, reflects a concern with administrative efficiency of immigration
proceedings (flight risk) and danger to the community. That is, even during the
65. See, e.g., Dada v. Witte, No. 20-CV-00458, 2020 WL 5510706 (W.D. La. Apr. 30,
2020 ), report and recommendation adopted in part, rejected in part, No. 20-CV-00458, 2020 WL 2614616
( W.D. La. May 22, 2020 ); Vazquez Barrera v. Wolf, 455 F. Supp. 3d 330, 338 ( S.D. Tex. 2020 ) ( applying
the reasonable relationship standard of review found in Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 539 ( 1979 ), to
plaintiffs’ assertions of Fifth Amendment due process violations ). Contra Coronel v. Decker, 449
F. Supp. 3d 274, 284 ( S.D.N.Y. 2020 ) ( applying the deliberate indifference standard to immigration
detainees’ substantive due process claims but ordering detainees’ release ).
66. See, e.g., Saillant v. Hoover, 454 F. Supp. 3d 465, 471 ( M.D. Pa. 2020 ) ( detailing a
“non-exhaustive list of factors” to be considered when determining release ).
67. Dada, 2020 WL 5510706, at *22–23.
68. Id. at *14–22.
69. See e.g., Saillant, 454 F. Supp. 3d at 471.
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COVID-19 pandemic, federal judges considered the “efficient” immigration
adjudication system to be as important as the health of detainees.
Moreover, courts did not inquire whether detention was actually necessary to
achieve the goals of immigration efficacy. Under the INA, detention is warranted
to prevent flight or security risks (or both).70 However, as argued in Part IV, there
is no evidence that either of these goals are actually attained by immigration
detention,71 or that they could not be better attained through other measures.72
Nevertheless, it is assumed that immigration detention serves a purpose even in
extraordinary circumstances that should, at the very least, make us question whether
detention is necessary at that moment in time. In other words, if courts were
generally reluctant to devalue the purpose of detention even in the throes of a global
pandemic, it seems unlikely that legal analysis will ever lead courts to conclude that
alternative measures to detention are preferable to confinement.
It is worth noting that in the majority of the COVID-19 litigation, plaintiffs
had underlying health conditions, which was why they were selected to be plaintiffs
in the first place. That is, these cases were not brought on behalf of individuals who
were healthy yet still at heightened risk of being infected by the coronavirus in
comparison to the general population, as there is continually increasing evidence
that prisons and jails are some of the most at-risk environments in the country.73
Rather, cases were brought on behalf of individuals who were even more in danger
of major complications if they became infected. Even in these scenarios, however,
courts were reluctant to release physically vulnerable people from detention. This
reluctance reflects courts’ view of immigration detention as acceptable as long as
the executive branch has decided to carry it out. Only under very particular and
drastic conditions will courts force the government to release a detainee.
I point to this litigation because it presented extreme and unprecedented
circumstances through which we can assess the value in pursuing litigation as a
strategic endeavor to challenge immigration detention. I emphasize the strategic
70. Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 236(a ), ( c )( 1 ). See also Fatahi, 26 I. & N. Dec. 791,
793 (2016 ) ( “An alien who seeks a change in custody status must establish to the satisfaction of the
Immigration Judge and the Board that he is not ‘a threat to national security, a danger to the community
at large, likely to abscond, or otherwise a poor bail risk.’” ( citing Guerra, 24 I. & N. Dec. 37, 39 ( 2006 ) ).
71. Over eighty-five percent of immigrants in non-detained removal proceedings attend their
hearings and there is no evidence showing that subjecting people to detention makes people safer. See,
e.g., Eagly et al., supra note 9. Nonetheless judges—be they immigration judges in bond proceedings or
federal judges reviewing constitutional claims—do not adjust their analysis to reflect that the likelihood
of flight risk or security risk is great. In the end, immigrants have the burden of proving they will show
up and are not a threat to life or property. Given the unlikelihood of either, however, we should question
whether it would be beneficial for that burden to shift to the government. After all, detention is rather
costly—much more so than alternatives to detention—so if the government wants to hold people then
it should bear the burden of proving detainees are a flight or safety risk.
72. Fatma E. Marouf, Alternatives to Immigration Detention, 38 CARDOZO L. Rev. 2141, 2143
( 2017 ) ( outlining alternatives to detention from releasing individuals on their own recognizance to
electronic monitoring and community-based alternatives ).
73. See Michael Ollove, How COVID-19 in Jails and Prisons Threatens Nearby Communities,
PEW ( July 1, 2020 ), https://pew.org/3eMrIM1 [ https://perma.cc/Z8PF-RJH5 ].
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aspect because, evidently, there is value in pursuing litigation as an individual matter.
Furthermore, this is what litigants do.74 However, the normative question here is
whether, as a matter of obtaining substantive policy shifts, it is a good strategy to
devote considerable resources to pursuing constitutional challenges to detention.
These cases show that, even in the midst of a highly contagious airborne
pandemic that mainly spreads by being in close proximity to others, courts will be
reluctant to release individuals from detention, let alone find that their detention is
unconstitutional. The outcomes in these cases confirm the overall history of the
judiciary’s deference to the executive branch in immigration law matters generally
and immigration detention specifically.75 Given the remarkable resources required
to find cases and fight them in Court, it may be beneficial to redirect some of those
efforts into other areas of advocacy. Of course, strategic litigation and advocacy
need not be mutually exclusive, but insofar as there are constraints to what
reformers can accomplish, litigation seems to be an inefficient intervention.
In the remainder of this Article, I describe the rise in immigration detention
and how it relates to criminal incarceration more broadly. This will lead me to
suggest that the way to end immigration confinement is through criminal legal
reform efforts writ large. In the next Part, I will start by outlining the factors that
have driven the tremendous growth in immigration detention in an effort to show
why immigration reform efforts that stop short of ending immigration detention
practices will also fail.
II. THE RISE IN IMMIGRATION DETENTION
Immigration detention is a growing phenomenon in the United States (and the
world).76 In the United States, immigration detention is allowed under the INA,
section 236. This Part stipulates who can be detained (in sum, any noncitizen whose
ability to enter or remain in the United States is in question) and who must be
detained (noncitizens with certain criminal convictions). “Between fiscal years 1994
74. It is also the bulk of the work that I do as a clinician.
75. I am not arguing here, or above, that the executive authority over immigration has not been
challenged or restrained. There are numerous cases where it has been. See, e.g., Zadvydas v. Davis, 533
U.S. 678 ( 2001 ); Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 237–39 ( 1896 ) ( holding that it was
unconstitutional to subject deportees to hard labor prior to deportation ). My claim is only that, these
cases notwithstanding, overall, the judiciary has accepted the federal government’s almost exclusive
authority over immigration law matters. Note, however, that this is not how the Court has treated
constitutional protections for noncitizens in areas other than immigration law. See Motomura, supra note
47( showing that courts have been consistent in affording citizens and noncitizens alike protections in
areas other than immigration, like discrimination ).
76. As Stephanie Silverman and Evelyne Massa put it, “[ a ]s of 2012, all liberal, democratic states
practice some form of immigration detention.” Stephanie J. Silverman & Evelyne Massa, Why
Immigration Detention Is Unique, 18 POPULATION SPACE & PLACE 677, 677 ( 2012 ). Data from the
Global Detention Project shows that immigration detention is a global phenomenon. See Detention
Centres, GLOB. DET. PROJECT, https://www.globaldetentionproject.org/detention-centres/map-view,
[ https://perma.cc/3282-RNTB ] ( last visited July 15, 2022 ). For an international look at immigration
incarceration, see, for example, D ETAINING THE I MMIGRANT O THER : G LOBAL AND
TRANSNATIONAL ISSUES ( Rich Furman, Douglas Epps & Greg Lampheareds., 2016 ).
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and 2017, the [Average Daily Population (ADP)]77 of immigrant detainees in the
United States climbed steadily from 6,785 to 38,106, a more than fivefold
increase.”78 Over the past five years, after a slight decline before 2015, the ADP
steadily rising to more than fifty thousand in 2019 and has currently leveled off at
about forty thousand.79
Much of legal scholarship, unsurprisingly, attributes the rise in detention
to changes in law.80 Legal explanations center on the expansion of the kinds of
criminal convictions that trigger immigration consequences and/or mandatory
detention, as well as policies that allow for the detention of asylum seekers.81
However, these legal and policy changes are necessary, but not sufficient, conditions
for increased detention.
In reality, immigration detention is a result of law on the ground, not law on
the books. That is, the law creates the opportunity for federal actors to detain
immigrants, but the large levels of detention are not mandated by law.82 According
to the INA, “pending a decision on whether the alien [sic] is to be removed
from the United States,” an individual can be subject to detention either because
they represent a flight or security risk (or both), or because they have a criminal
conviction rendering them subject to mandatory detention.83 Although some

77. Because there is a high-volume daily turnover of immigrants in detention, and seasonality
affects migration numbers, analyses of immigration detention usually use the ADP as a way to measure
detention levels. The ADP, as implied by the name, is simply calculated by dividing the total population
of detained immigrants in a particular time period by the number of days in that time period.
78. Emily Ryo, Understanding Immigration Detention: Causes, Conditions, and Consequences,
15 ANN. REV. L. SOC. SCI. 97, 101 (2019 ).
79. A recent drop can be attributed to the slowing of entries due to the policy known as
Migration Protection Protocol as well as the closing of the border due to the Coronavirus. As this drop
reflects current temporary policies but not the trend observed for the last six years, we cannot suppose
that it reflects an actual drop in the use of detention.
80. See Ryo, supra note 78, at 98.
81. Immigration scholars often point to the Anti-Drug Abuse Acts of 1986 and 1988, the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act ( AEDPA ) of 1996, and the Illegal Immigration Reform
and Immigrant Responsibility Act ( IIRAIRA ) of 1996 as being the three main legal drivers of
immigration detention. See generally, Jennifer M. Chacón, Immigration Detention: No Turning Back?,
113 S. ATL. Q. 621, 622 ( 2014 ); Das, supra note 29; Philip L. Torrey, Rethinking Immigration’s Mandatory
Detention Regime: Politics, Profit, and the Meaning of “Custody,” 48 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 879 ( 2015 ).
82.
This is further supported by the fact that DHS provides guidelines determining their
enforcement priorities, demonstrating that law enforcement actions like detention are generally a choice
not a mandate. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., GUIDELINES FOR THE ENFORCEMENT OF
CIVIL IMMIGRATION LAW, 7, 2 ( 2021 ) https://www.ice.gov/doclib/news/guidelines-civilimmigrationlaw.pdf
[ https://perma.cc/C93U-YXP2 ] ( vacated by Texas v. United States, No. 21-CV-00016, 2022 WL
2109204, at *47 ( S.D. Tex. June 10, 2022 ) ). That the precise scope of these memoranda is a matter of
litigation does not take away from the main point that enforcement is subject to policy choices.
83. Immigration and Nationality Act § 236( a ), ( c )( 1 ); see also Fatahi, 26 I. & N. Dec. 791, 793
( 2016 ) (“An alien who seeks a change in custody status must establish to the satisfaction of the
Immigration Judge and the Board that he is not ‘a threat to national security, a danger to the community
at large, likely to abscond, or otherwise a poor bail risk.’” ( citing Guerra, 24 I. & N. Dec. 37,
39 ( 2006 ) ) ).
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argue that even the INA’s mandatory provisions allow for discretion,84 it is
clear that at least some85 custody determinations are made by immigration officers.
That decision can be made at any time during formal removal proceedings.86 If an
individual is detained, then they can request a bond hearing before an immigration
judge (and therefore before the Department of Justice rather than the Department
of Homeland Security).87 In this way, every detainee that is not subject to
mandatory detention is the result of one or many actors that have—as a matter of
discretion—determined that the individual poses a flight or safety risk. I am by no
means arguing that individuals never fit this profile, but rather that the detention
of those individuals is not mandated by law.
Furthermore, even mandatory detention is a result of particular enforcement
decisions. Across all areas, underenforcement of laws is both standard and
permissible.88 Of course, at a certain point, not enforcing constitutional laws
becomes unlawful.89 Nevertheless, the extent to which immigration enforcement
articulates priorities that land more people in mandatory detention is also a result of
policy decisions, not law. In a sense, under the Obama administration, whether
under the Secure Communities Program or the Priority Enforcement Program
(“PEP”), the explicit targeting of individuals detained by local law enforcement
officers, who are thus more likely to have criminal records, is a high-level policy
choice that rendered likelier the detention of a greater percentage of the people
subject to immigration enforcement.90
Finally, the fact that rising detention has to do with enforcement choices,
rather than legal mandates, can be surmised through the chronology of detention
itself. Most of the reforms that expanded the grounds for detaining immigrants
84. Torrey, supra note 81, at 883 ( arguing that the mandatory detention statute in the INA could
be interpreted in a way to give ICE more discretion over custody determinations ).
85. Exact percentages of how many people in detention recently are confined due to mandatory
detention provisions is unknown because ICE has not released enough data. While the Obama
administration was pursuing the Secure Communities program, a large majority of people in detention
were there due to INA § 236( c )( 1 ).
86. 8 C.F.R. § 236.1(g )( 1 ) ( 2016 ) ( “At the time of issuance of the notice to appear, or at any
time thereafter and up to the time removal proceedings are completed, an immigration official may
issue a Form I-286, Notice of Custody Determination.” ).
87. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19( a ) ( 2006 ) (“Custody and bond determinations made by [ ICE] pursuant
to 8 CFR part 1236 may be reviewed by an Immigration Judge pursuant to 8 CFR part 1236.” ).
88. See Gerald L. Neuman, Anomalous Zones, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1197, 1205 ( 1996 ) ( explaining
the circumstances under which law is not enforced as a matter of policy ); Jonathan M. Barnett, The
Rational Underenforcement of Vice Laws, 54 RUTGERS L. REV. 423, 426 (2002 ) ( claiming that not
enforcing certain laws is a cost-beneficial strategy for certain crimes ). But see Alexandra Natapoff,
Underenforcement, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1715, 1717–18 (2006 ) ( criticizing underenforcement because
it reflects the inequities in power of those who are subject to the law ).
89. See Cox & Rodríguez, supra note 18, at 174–208 ( arguing that the best way to identify the
legality of this suspension is to analyze whether and how it has been institutionalized ).
90. For a summary and critique of Secure Communities, see Christopher N. Lasch, Rendition
Resistance, 92 N.C. L. REV. 149, 154–56 ( 2014 ). For a summary and critique of both Secure
Communities and PEP, see Juliet P. Stumpf, D( e )volving Discretion: Lessons from the Life and Times of
Secure Communities, 64 AM. U. L. REV. 1259 ( 2015 ).
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occurred in the 1980s and 1990s, but we have seen continual growth in detention
levels long after the reforms were passed. Between 1994 and 2004 the ADP
increased from 6,785 to 21,928.91 However, since then, immigration detention has
been more characterized by sudden jumps. Between 2005 and 2007 the ADP rose
by over 10,000, stabilizing at around 32,000 until 2015, and since then, it grew again
by around 10,000—with the caveat that in 2019 it reached 52,000.92
If the law were responsible for the growth in detention, we would not expect
this rise in fits and starts, but rather we would see a continuous rise or—at the very
minimum—numbers that track some indicator related to migration. We do not see
this, however. In fact, there seems to be an inverse relationship between the actual
levels of migration and the number of people in immigration detention.93
A number of studies have pointed to factors other than the law that explain
the recent expansion of immigration detention. Emily Ryo and Ryan Peacock, for
example, have shown that political and economic factors push localities to
participate in detention. They observed that localities where immigration detention
grew were those with high levels of unemployment that were “relatively small,
nonurban . . . , largely Republican and located in the South.”94 This collaboration is
crucial because a driver of increased detention is the extent to which immigration
laws are enforced by local authorities.95 Those jurisdictions that cooperate with
federal agencies in enforcing immigration laws apprehend more people and
therefore have more immigration detention.96 Another factor is the existence of

91. See Emily Ryo & Ian Peacock, A National Study of Immigration Detention in the United
States, 92 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 10 fig.1 ( 2018 ).
92. See id.
93. Ryo, supra note 78, at 98.
94. Ryo & Peacock, supra note 38, at 87.
95. Local governments are able to cooperate with immigration enforcement authorities through
287( g ) agreements, coming from INA § 287( g ) which allows these types of intergovernmental
cooperation. Scholars have identified that these agreements increase the enforcement capacity of the
Federal Government. See DORIS MARIE PROVINE, MONICA W. VARSANYI, PAUL G. LEWIS & SCOTT
H. DECKER, POLICING IMMIGRANTS: LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT ON THE FRONT LINES ( 2016 ).
96. Jillian Jaeger has shown that the actual enforcement capacities of a locality, not only whether
or not they sign 287( g ) agreements, matter in determining how many immigrants are in fact detained.
See Jillian Jaeger, Securing Communities or Profits? The Effect of Federal-Local Partnerships on Immigration
Enforcement, ST. POL. & POL’Y Q. 362 ( 2016 ); see also Margot Moinester, Beyond the Border and Into the
Heartland: Spatial Patterning of U.S. Immigration Detention, 55 DEMOGRAPHY 1147, 1147 ( 2018 )
( showing tremendous disparities in likelihood of immigration enforcement in the United States is
explained by geographical factors ).
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private prisons.97 Other recent analyses have shown that differences in adjudication
may be contributing to increased detention.98
In sum, expansion of civil immigration detention is determined not only by
law and policy, but by geography, race, and politics. Consequently, reform that
focuses only on changing the applicable grounds for detention will not prevent
continued growth in enforcement and detention. As long as detention is legal, the
executive can enforce laws such that detention continues to grow. Legislators,
generally, want their policies to withstand countering ideological impulses from a
future administration. However, given the large discretion that the executive is
given, and the large impact of the particular decisions of various law enforcement
actors—from local police officers to immigration judges—on the overall level of
detention, legislation that does not end immigration detention will not be a durable
solution curtailing its use.99
Even with an executive branch that wants to end detention, at the core of
these dynamics, the reality is that immigration detention has begun to occupy
carceral spaces such that it may in fact prevent decarceration. That is, even if
criminal legal reform is successful in emptying jails, confinement levels may not
change as much if immigration detention remains legal. This is a product of the fact
that immigration detention has generally become ensconced in the criminal legal
system.100 This process has led to the development of the subfield of
“crimmigration,” which—as suggested by the name—is defined as “the
intertwinement of crime control and migration control.” 101 I turn to this
development in the next Subsection. It is necessary to understand this process to
see why anti-immigration detention efforts will be more successful if they are
constructed as anti-incarceration projects more generally.

97. See Torrey, supra note 81, at 896–97 (arguing that “private prisons wield a level of political
capital that can ensure harsh custody policies and practices” ); Loren Collingwood, Jason L. Morin
& Stephen Omar El-Khatib, Expanding Carceral Markets: Detention Facilities, ICE Contracts, and the
Financial Interests of Punitive Immigration Policy, 10 RACE SOC. PROBS. 275 (2018 ) ( finding that the
mere presence of a private prison that holds immigration detention is predictive of the likelihood that
legislators will co-sponsor harsh immigration legislation ).
98. Ingrid Eagly, Steven Shafer & Jana Whalley, Detaining Families: A Study of Asylum
Adjudication in Family Detention, 106 CALIF. L. REV. 785, 792 ( 2018 ).
99. Furthermore, given the complicated politics of immigration, it is likely complicated to end
detention as an immigration issue.
100. As David C. Brotherton and Philip Kretsedemas write in their introduction to their
collection Immigration Policy in an Age of Punishment, “[ t ]he punitive public culture that has come
to define immigration policy can be understood as the emblematic feature of an age, a zeitgeist of the
times.” See PHILIP KRETSEDEMAS & DAVID C. BROTHERTON, Introduction: Immigration Policy in an
Age of Punishment, in IMMIGRATION POLICY IN THE AGE OF PUNISHMENT: DETENTION,
DEPORTATION, AND BORDER CONTROL ( 2017 ).
101. Joanne van der Leun & Maartje van der Woude, A Reflection on Crimmigration in the
Netherlands: On the Cultural Security Complex and the Impact of Framing, in SOCIAL CONTROL AND
JUSTICE: CRIMMIGRATION IN THE AGE OF FEAR 41, 43 ( Maria Joāo Guia, Maartje van der Woude
& Joanne van der Leun eds., 2013 ).
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III. IMMIGRATION DETENTION AND INCARCERATION: A GROWING
RELATIONSHIP
A. How the Detainee Can Become the Inmate: The Role of Crimmigration
That immigration and criminal law have become intertwined is not a novel
idea. Crimmigration as a field shows that both criminal and immigration law have
become more similar. On the criminal side, crimmigration is seen in the “dispensing
[of] certain procedural protections traditionally afforded criminal defendants when
immigration-related activity forms the basis for the criminal prosecution.”102 On the
immigration side, scholars usually point to the growth in crimes with immigration
consequences, the criminalization of migration, and the use of traditional police and
military tactics for immigration enforcement.103
Furthermore, “immigration enforcement and criminal justice [have come to]
form part of the same carceral regime and occupy the same carceral space.”104
Both immigration detention and incarceration occur in jails that are either the
same or look the same. More importantly, perhaps, they are both experienced
as punishment.105
The convergence of immigration detention and incarceration can be
understood through the prism of the “total institution.” In a 2006 article, Bernard
Harcourt suggested such an analysis in a different context.106 He argued that we
should measure institutionalization by the combined number of people in both
prisons and mental health asylums in part because both of those institutions are
addressing the same kinds of concerns.107 Harcourt’s work was motivated by
decades of social theory that had explored how institutions affected social structures
and, in particular, at the rise of “total institutions.” In this literature, a total
institution is “a place of residence and work where a large number of like-situated

102. García Hernández, supra note 28, at 1457.
103. See id.; Juliet Stumpf, The Crimmigration Crisis: Immigrants, Crime, and Sovereign Power, 56
AM. U. L. REV. 367 ( 2006 ).
104. Ryo, supra note 78, at 99.
105. See García Hernández, supra note 28, at 1359 ( arguing that immigration detention
is punitive from a rule-based approach arguing that whether detention is civil or criminal depends
on legislative intent and “[ i ]f Congress developed the immigration detention statutory scheme within
a political context infused with a desire to punish immigrants, as [ this Article ] posits it did, then
to detain is necessarily to punish” ); see also Anil Kalhan, Rethinking Immigration Detention, 110
COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 42, 49 (2010 ) (making the functionalist argument that immigration detention
conditions are so harsh that it is in fact a “quasi punitive regime” ); Mary Bosworth, Subjectivity and
Identity in Detention: Punishment and Society in a Global Age, 16 THEORETICAL CRIMINOLOGY 123,
124 ( 2012 ) ( carrying out an ethnography of immigration detention in the U.K. to show how civil
detention has become punitive ).
106. Harcourt, supra note 26. I mention Harcourt’s work also because Marie Gottschalk points
to the successes of deinstutionalization, whereby thanks to federal leadership, states were able to close
mental institutions in the latter half of the 20th Century. Gottschalk, supra note 21. However, Harcourt’s
work pushes us to reconsider deinstitutionalization; showing that it was nothing but a substitution. The
same dynamic was also found to occur in France. See Raoult & Harcourt, supra note 26.
107. Harcourt, supra note 26, at 1755.

Second to Printer_Gerson.docx (Do Not Delete)

2022 ]

EMBRACING CRIMMIGRATION

9/29/2022 9:02 PM

1229

individuals, cut off from the wider society for an appreciable period of time,
together lead an enclosed, formally administered round of life.”108 While a boarding
school and a prison were both “total institutions,” Erving Goffman categorized
institutions into different types according to their stated purpose.109
Harcourt, following Goffman and others’110 analysis, understood asylums,
prisons, and jails as the same particular type of total institution because all of them
were built and operated to address perceived human threats to society. As Harcourt
wrote, “mental illness was an abstraction designed to rationalize the confinement
of individuals who manifested disruptive and aberrant behavior and the asylum’s
primary function was to confine social deviants and/or unproductive persons.”111
This function, according to Harcourt, is now carried on by the prison.112
Immigration detention can also be understood as a total institution. In a legal
sense, detention is at least partly warranted on community safety grounds. As the
Supreme Court put it, immigration detention “has two regulatory goals: ensuring
the appearance of aliens at future immigration proceedings and preventing danger
to the community.”113 We see this reflected in Section 236 of the INA, which
mandates detention114 for people with certain criminal records and precludes
immigration judges from releasing individuals when they are deemed to “pose a
danger to the safety of other persons or of property.”115 The Supreme Court has
found that detention can be extended for as long as the government sees fit without
triggering mandatory administrative review.116 In this sense, immigration detention,
like jails, serves the function of confining individuals who can be considered
108. ERVING GOFFMAN, ASYLUMS: ESSAYS ON THE SOCIAL SITUATIONS OF MENTAL
PATIENTS AND OTHER INMATES ( 1961 ).
109. Id.
110. David Rothman’s The Discovery of the Asylum: Social Order and Disorder in the New
Republic (1971 ) and Michel Foucault’s Madness and Civilization are particularly influential.
111. Harcourt, supra note 26, at 1759.
112. Harcourt also justified his analysis on functionalist grounds. He writes, “what we are trying
to capture when we use the variable of imprisonment is something about confinement in an
institutional setting—confinement that renders the population in question incapacitated or unable
to work, pursue educational opportunities, and so forth.” Id. at 1755. In other words, when we are
using incarceration as an explanatory variable, we are actually trying to understand the effects of
confinement writ large. Therefore, according to Harcourt, we should use a full count of confinement
for these analyses. Id. at 1756. Measuring institutionalization by the combined number of people in
both prisons and mental health asylums, Harcourt showed that a rise in incarceration rates since the
1970’s was not a rise in institutionalization. Id. at 1755. Confinement remained constant, but the
proportion confined in mental health hospitals had decreased while the proportion confined in prisons
had increased. Id. at 1755.
113. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 ( 2001 ).
114. The Supreme Court has held that mandatory detention is constitutional. Demore v. Kim,
538 U.S. 510 ( 2003 ).
115. Immigration and Nationality Act § 236( c )( 2 ), 8 U.S.C. § 1226( c )( 2 ).
116. See Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830 ( 2018 ). In that case the court struck down a
Ninth Circuit decision holding that mandatory administrative review of bond decisions was necessary
after six months in detention. The Court did not indicate if mandatory review was ever necessary, but
without any guidance we can assume that mandatory bond review is unavailable regardless of the length
of detention.
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dangerous. The fact that it holds other individuals that are not dangerous, such as
asylum seekers or children, on efficiency grounds does not negate that the detention
is also propped up by the same sorts of concerns as criminal incarceration. In
addition to this, as discussed supra, immigrant detention occurs in carceral spaces
and is understood as punishment by its subjects, and the rise in legal framework that
allowed immigration detention to increase arose at the same time and from the same
concerns that brought mass incarceration. Immigration detention can therefore also
be understood as a “total institution” in the same way that prisons and jails are.
This conceptualization matters because it helps show the degree of proximity
between immigration detention and criminal incarceration.117 It is not only that they
look the same but that they are similarly legally legitimized. Of course, incarceration
is not only justified on public safety grounds, but others such as retribution and
rehabilitation. Likewise, as mentioned in the preceding paragraph, immigration
detention is about more than community safety. My argument here is not that they
are both legally justified on exactly the same grounds, but rather that the legal
rationales for both overlap.
Furthermore, scholars have argued that the rise of crimmigration itself has
allowed for immigrants to be understood as criminals.118 Both the criminalization
of illegal entry, with the high visibility of prosecution and persecution of this crime,
and the continued rhetoric and enforcement of laws against the “criminal alien,” are
fomenting the creation of the “crimmigrant.” Other scholars propose, rather, that
crimmigration is the result of a history of disdain for immigrants of color along with

117. Moreover, this overlap matters in terms of social science. Scholarship and policy about
incarceration will be flawed if they don’t account for immigration detention. Harcourt made a
compelling case that analyses using imprisonment as an explanatory variable alone are limited because
“what we are trying to capture when we use the variable of imprisonment is something about
confinement in an institutional setting—confinement that renders the population in question
incapacitated or unable to work, pursue educational opportunities.” See Harcourt, supra note 26, at 1755.
If, for example, we were measuring the economic impact of decarceration and did not factor in that
some of that decarceration was tempered by immigration detention, we would be underestimating the
impact of our variable of interest. After all, immigration detention could ensure that employment at
correctional facilities remained relatively stable ( and thus all the secondary market impacts do as well ).
Properly estimating this impact is not merely academic. The success of decarceration efforts will depend
on properly anticipating their economic toll. Much of criminal legal reform is justified on economic
grounds. This means that, for many, decarceration will only make sense if it is an economically viable
project. In this sense, wider decarceration efforts will hinge on public policy evaluations that properly
estimate the impact that closing jails has had. Accurately doing this will require us to factor in
immigration detention. The same is true for any other covariate of interest. If one is trying to measure
the effect of incarceration on employment, crime, housing, etc., immigration detention is relevant to
truly capture the effect of institutional confinement on those outcomes.
118. Judith Ann Warner, The Social Construction of the Criminal Alien in Immigration
Law, Enforcement Practice and Statistical Enumeration: Consequences for Immigrant Stereotyping,
J. SOC. & ECOLOGICAL BOUNDARIES, Winter 2005-2006, at 56, 57 ( arguing that immigrants were
seen as criminals once the legal category “criminal alien” was formed ). See Xia Wang, Undocumented
Immigrants as Perceived Criminal Threat: A Test of the Minority Threat Perspective, 50 CRIMINOLOGY
743, 743 ( 2012 ) ( providing empirical evidence that places where people perceive the immigrant
population to be larger than it is are associated with having people that view immigrants as criminals ).
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a willingness of Americans to use “penal norms to address social phenomena
deemed problematic.”119 Whether the construction of immigrants as criminals is
first social and then legal or vice versa is unimportant, for both phenomena create
a feedback loop.120
Given crimmigration’s prevalence, we can expect immigration detention to
stay stable and, more likely, grow. After all, immigration control has now become
more closely associated with crime control.121 Not only has the crime of unlawful
entry literally become a priority for law enforcement, but the methods of crime
control, including confinement, have also become integral to immigration control.
Eventually, it may become difficult to determine whether carceral methods are
being used for or because of immigration or penal problems.122
B. How the Detainee Can Become the Inmate: The Role of Incentives
The rise of crimmigration helps explain why we may expect to see more
immigration detainees. In sum, the more immigrants are perceived as criminal, and
the more criminal methods and tools are used to regulate immigration—i.e., as the
crimmigration regime expands—the more we can expect the traditional tools of
criminal law to be used more frequently in the immigration context. Furthermore,
this can create a situation in which the problems of crime and immigration are
treated as one, following the same trajectory that mental health and crime did in the
previous century.123 This in turn may lead to seeing more immigrants fill up the bed
space created by decarceration efforts.
There are also more pragmatic reasons to expect a continued rise in
immigration detention. Prisons and jails are often advertised as good sources of

119. García Hernández, supra note 28, at 1460.
120. It is worth noting that this is particularly true for immigrants of color. Beyond the rhetoric
and policy from the Trump administration, immigration enforcement has largely been brought to bear
on Hispanic communities and the southern border, despite the fact that there are national security
threats coming from north of the border. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-19-470,
NORTHERN BORDER SECURITY: CBP IDENTIFIED RESOURCE CHALLENGES BUT NEEDS
PERFORMANCE MEASURES TO ASSESS SECURITY BETWEEN PORTS OF ENTRY ( 2019 ), https://
www.gao.gov/assets/710/700012.pdf [ https://perma.cc/YYJ3-FHCT ] ( “Border Patrol identified an
insufficient number of agents that limited patrol missions along the northern border . . . primarily
because CBP’s priority is to secure the U.S.-Mexico ( southwest ) border.” )
121. The recent Supreme Court decisions in the cases of Egbert v. Boule and Hernández v. Mesa
further cement this approach. Egbert v. Boule, 142 S. Ct. 1793, 1798 ( 2022 ); Hernandez v. Mesa, 140
S. Ct. 735, 744 ( 2020 ). Though both cases concern immigration law enforcement activity, the
analysis found therein is indistinguishable from that found in cases involving national criminal law
enforcement activities.
122. In Discipline and Punish, Michel Foucault explained that prison only became inevitable
after their construction and use. Similarly, immigration detention will seem natural and inevitable once
its use expands. MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH ( Alan Sheridan trans., Vintage Books
2d ed. 1995 ) ( 1977 ).
123. See Harcourt, supra note 26, at 1759–63.
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employment, and therefore good for communities’ economies.124 This is true even
when the economic impact of a correctional facility on a particular locality is not
clearly positive.125 Nevertheless, because of their perceived economic benefits, local
governments will be interested in keeping correctional facilities open because
decarceration will be perceived as a cost for localities.
First, each inmate loss represents a loss of income from the state that pays the
locality for incarcerating them. Second, as jails are emptied, you are likely to see
correctional officers losing their jobs. Both John Pfaff and Marie Gottschalk have
argued that an often-overlooked aspect of criminal legal reform is the role that
correctional officer unions can have in impeding criminal legal reform in order to
keep jails open.126
The immigration detainee is an attractive remedy for the potential costs of
decarceration. One big reason for that is that the federal government pays more per
detainee than the state does.127 Also, the immigration detainee is politically
disenfranchised, especially in the places where detention has grown in the last
decade.128 It is not only that undocumented immigrants have few political rights and
no representatives,129 but also that these facilities are located in areas far away from
communities that advocate on their behalf.
In terms of immigration detention, there is an even greater incentive to
participate, as there are no economic costs and only benefits for doing so.130 Many
local officials have gone on the record saying as much. When Allen Parish signed a
contract with ICE, Sheriff Doug Herbert III said, “[T]his facility will be good for
124. See, e.g., The Advantages of a Career as a Corrections Officer, CHRON. ( June 17, 2020 ),
https://work.chron.com/advantages-career-corrections-officer-15094.html [ https://perma.cc/2RW7-S4E7 ].
125. Compare Tracey L. Farrigan & Amy K. Glasmeier, The Economic Impacts of the Prison
Development Boom on Persistently Poor Rural Places, 30 INT’L REG’L SCI. REV. 274, 274 ( 2007 ) ( finding
that prison construction has “no significant economic effect on rural places in general, but [ ] may have
a positive impact on poverty rates in persistently poor rural counties . . . [ but that there is] little
evidence . . . that prison impacts were significant enough to foster structural economic change” ), with
Janjala Chirakijja, The Local Economic Impacts of Prisons 1 ( Oct. 1, 2018 ) ( unpublished working paper ),
https://economics.smu.edu.sg/sites/economics.smu.edu.sg/files/economics/pdf/Seminar/2019/
20190410.pdf [ https://perma.cc/B66T-86XD ] ( finding that correctional facilities are responsible for
a two to four percent decline in housing value ).
126. See John Pfaff, supra note 22, at 273–74; Gottschalk, supra note 21.
127. We don’t have an exact amount the federal government pays on a per facility basis.
However, as a point of comparison, Louisiana paid Richwood $28.07 per inmate while the federal
government paid $64.07. Noah Lanard, Louisiana Decided to Curb Mass Incarceration. Then ICE Showed
Up., M OTHER J ONES ( May 1, 2019 ), https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2019/05/
louisiana-decided-to-curb-mass-incarceration-then-ice-showed-up/ [ https://perma.cc/K6K7-3S57 ].
128. Ryo & Peacock, supra note 38, at 84–86 ( finding that between 1983 and 2013, rural and
small-scale urban counties with populations between 10,000 and 249,999 people were the counties that
experienced more growth in immigration detention ).
129. Some have argued that this in fact may not be a bad thing. Angelica Cházaro, for example,
argues that providing representation legitimizes a system that is fundamentally indefensible and pushes
off the possibility of deportation abolition. See Angélica Cházaro, The End of Deportation, 68 UCLA
L. REV. 1040 ( 2021 ).
130. There may be political losses due to pro-immigrant groups, but we know that in locations
where detention has grown, and is likely to grow, those groups are in the minority.

Second to Printer_Gerson.docx (Do Not Delete)

2022 ]

EMBRACING CRIMMIGRATION

9/29/2022 9:02 PM

1233

Allen Parish. It has already created a bunch of jobs and added additional law
enforcement officers. We will reap all the benefits, including the revenue.”131 Along
the same lines, Lily Morgan, County Commissioner of Josephine County in Oregon,
said of an ICE contract with a local jail that “[ICE] still [is] helping our
community . . . It’s still a revenue source to our community.”132 And finally, as
Lieutenant Bill Davis, of the Bossier, Louisiana Sheriff’s Office, said when asked
about the facility signing a contract with ICE, “[o]ur job is to house
inmates . . . whether they’re ICE inmates, or whether they’re parish or state, we’re
housing them. That’s it.”133
Emily Ryo and Ryan Peacock have already found evidence that some of the
factors just described are driving immigration detention growth. They wrote,
“[O]ur regression analysis results suggest that county labor market conditions,
together with relative ﬂuctuations in the local criminal inmate population, may generate a
policy environment that is particularly conducive to immigration detention.”134
More to the point, they found that “excess bed space positively moderates the
relationship between local unemployment rate and the likelihood of counties
holding ICE detainees.”135
These findings should tell us that the economic incentives outlined above
are likely to play an impact in the future as decarceration continues (if it does). As
more local jails lose inmates, we may see a greater need to replace the revenues from
these in some way. I have outlined above why the immigration detainee may just be
that replacement.
IV. OPPORTUNITIES FOR IMMIGRATION AND CRIMINAL LEGAL REFORMS
So far, I have laid out the current relationship between decarceration and
immigration detention. To summarize, through both legal and social processes,
both systems have intertwined and begun a process of reification. This, on its own,
should mean that any movement to end or decrease the confined population needs
to be a work of both criminal and immigration legal reform.
In this Section, I take a normative turn to outline why advocates of
decarceration and immigration detention share similar preoccupations. This leads
me to conclude that efforts to decrease the use of incarceration are limited if they
are focused solely on criminal law, not only because they ignore a large portion of
the confined population, but also because they will miss how decarceration efforts
131. Doris Maricle, A Look Inside Allen Parish Detention Center: Public Tours $5M Facility
Built to House Federal Detainees, AM.PRESS ( June 15, 2019 ), https://www.americanpress.com/news/local/
public-tours-mfacility-built-to-house-federal-detainees/article_d38c67f8-9127-11e9-8257-8782841260c4.html
[ https://perma.cc/KK4J-5HXU ].
132. Conrad Wilson, ICE Pays to Use 2 Oregon Jails Despite Sanctuary State Law, OPB
( June 21, 2018, 2:37 PM ), https://www.opb.org/news/article/ice-jail-oregon-norcor-josephinecontract-sanctuary-state/ [ https://perma.cc/962J-W6S4 ].
133. Lanard, supra note 127.
134. Ryo & Peacock, supra note 38, at 91.
135. Id. at 88.
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may be foiled through alternative methods of confinement. Moreover, because of
the very serious legal constraints outlined in Parts I and II faced by immigration
advocates, I argue that it would be advantageous to pursue immigration detention
reform within broader criminal decarceration efforts.
Political support for decarceration is growing.136 We can see this reflected
in the passing of criminal legal reform at the state and/or federal level,137 the
election of progressive prosecutors,138 and/or the growth of abolitionist rhetoric

136. See, e.g., BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST., ENDING MASS INCARCERATION: IDEAS FROM
TODAY’S LEADERS ( Inimai Chettiar & Priya Raghavan eds., 2019 ), https://www.brennancenter.org/
our-work/policy-solutions/ending-mass-incarceration-ideas-todays-leaders [ https://perma.cc/25GSL4EJ ].
137. Legislatures all across the United States have taken some of these measures and enacted
laws that adopt one or many of these policies. From January of 2015 through March of 2020, there
have been forty-one state and federal initiatives under the broad banner of criminal legal reform. Out
of all these bills, thirteen were passed—many in conservative states like Mississippi, Georgia, or
Louisiana—sixteen failed, and the rest are still being discussed. The efficacy of these bills is quite
contested. After all, most of them focus on “nonserious, nonviolent, non-sex-related offenders,” the
least impactful issues in terms of mass incarceration. See GOTTSCHALK, supra note 21, at 259; see also
JOHN F. PFAFF, LOCKED IN: THE TRUE CAUSES OF MASS INCARCERATION—AND HOW TO
ACHIEVE REAL REFORM 205–06 ( 2017 ).
138.
The figure of the progressive prosecutor is on the rise, Stephanie Morales was elected
Commonwealth’s Attorney in Portsmouth, Virginia in 2015 and re-elected in 2017; Kim Foxx was
elected State’s Attorney for Cook County, Illinois ( Chicago ) in 2016; Aramis Ayala was elected State
Attorney for the Ninth Judicial Circuit of Florida in 2016; Larry Krasner was elected District Attorney
of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania in 2017; Rachel Rollins was elected District Attorney of Suffolk County,
Massachusetts ( Boston ) in 2018; Wesley Bell was elected Prosecuting Attorney of St. Louis County in
2018; Chesa Boudin was elected District Attorney of San Francisco, California in 2019. See, e.g., Seema
Gajwani & Max G. Lesser, The Hard Truths of Progressive Prosecution and a Path to Realizing the
Movement’s Promise, 64 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 69, 71 n.12 ( 2020 ) ( citing Emily Bazelon & Miriam
Krinsky, Opinion, There’s a Wave of New Prosecutors. And They Mean Justice, N.Y. Times ( Dec. 11,
2018 ), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/11/opinion/how-local-prosecutors-can-reform-theirjustice-systems.html [ https://perma.cc/JQX6-F7L9 ] ). Though Boudin was recently ousted in a special
recall election, most progressive prosecutors have won reelection. It is therefore not clear that Boudin’s
defeat is the end of the progressive prosecution movement. Whether much of the promise held in
progressive prosecution is fundamentally misguided is yet to be seen. Id. at 71 ( noting that progressive
prosecutors will still prosecute violent crime, which is a main driver of rates of incarceration in the
United States, that the system still will weigh favorably towards plea bargaining, and that internal
resistance will impede significant impact ); see also Note, The Paradox of “Progressive Prosecution,” 132
HARV. L. REV. 748, 759 ( 2018 ) ( adopting a critical theory on the notion of progressive prosecution,
exposing the limits of reformist efforts within the law when the laws as currently written reflect racially
driven motives that were “never intended to keep marginalized people safe” ); Brad Haywood, Busting
the Myth, INQUEST ( June 10, 2022 ), https://inquest.org/busting-the-myth-progressive-prosecutors/
[ https://perma.cc/HQ6B-MTXS ] ( arguing that progressive prosecutors have not actually changed
prosecution policies very much ).
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and proposals.139 Of course, all of these efforts are limited, either in scope140
or short-term feasibility.141 However, even moderately successful reforms
can be profound.
The current decrease in the prison population is illustrative. According to data
from the Vera Institute of Justice, between 2010 and 2016, the number of people
incarcerated has dropped by 176,400 people.142 In the scale of the total carceral
population, this change seems modest. However, if we think in terms of numbers
of facilities, we can see that a drop of 170,000 is not insignificant. A decarceration
of that scale, if carried out uniformly, could mean closing between 140 to 170
prisons (depending on the size of the prisons closed) across the country.143 Given
that there are only seventy-four “large” prisons in the United States (those holding
over 2,500 people), closing 100 prisons would not be minor.144 Of course, assuming
that prisons will close at the same rate as the incarceration population falls is
unrealistic. Just as prison growth was and is uneven, so is decarceration.
Nonetheless, this exercise is useful so as to not minimize important gains.
139. Angela Davis, Dorothy Roberts, and Allegra McLeod, among others, have with renewed
force pushed the academy to reconsider abolitionist ideas. See, e.g., ANGELA Y. DAVIS, ARE PRISONS
OBSOLETE? ( 2003 ); Roberts, supra note 34; McLeod, supra note 34. I do not suggest that this list is
exhaustive nor that these writers have been the first or only ones to advance abolitionist arguments in
the legal academy generally. The abolitionist movement started over fifty years ago and abolitionist
ideas have been in scholarship since then. However, in the last few years we have seen renewed interest
in these ideas, in part as a response to these scholars.
140. A fundamental issue of reformist agendas is that they are technocratic approaches for
political problems. As Marie Gottschalk has articulated, “criminal justice is fundamentally a political
problem, not a crime and punishment or a dollars-and-cents problem.” See GOTTSCHALK, supra note
21, at 22. Moreover, as David Garland has suggested, without confronting the causes of violence,
namely unrestrained market forces and minimal safety nets, technocratic efforts to decarcerate will not
bring the U.S. incarceration rates in line with the rest of the world. See David Garland, Penal Controls
and Social Controls: Toward a Theory of American Penal Exceptionalism, 22 PUNISHMENT & SOC’Y 321,
322–23 ( 2019 ).
141. Even proponents of abolitionism acknowledge that the types of changes being advocated
will take time. See McLeod, supra note 34, at 1161 ( arguing that the goal of abolitionism is not merely
to close jails, rather, the objective is to imagine and build an alternative that better and more humanely
achieves the goals that jails are meant to: deterrence, incapacitation, rehabilitation, and retribution ).
142. About Incarceration Trends: Methodology, Data, and Acknowldgements, VERA INST. OF
JUST., https://trends.vera.org/methodology/ [ https://perma.cc/8PN2-DE84 ] ( last visited
Sept. 9, 2022 ). The Bureau of Justice Statistics ( BJS) shows a different number because it reports
people in state and federal facilities, not local jails. See Quick Tables, BUREAU OF
JUST. STAT., https://csat.bjs.ojp.gov/quick-tables [ https://perma.cc/EV9G-YJHX ] ( choose
“1978–2019” under the “Years” column in the top row, “Prisoners under the jurisdiction of state or
federal correctional authorities, December 31, 1978–2019” ) ( noting that there were 1,613,803 in 2010
and 1,506,757 in 2016 ).
143. This is a very rough estimate based on BJS data about correctional facilities. Per that data,
there are 1,821 state and federal prisons. See BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., supra note 142. In terms of
capacity, the BJS divides prisons into four categories: those that fit fewer than 500 (small ), between
500–999 (medium ), from 1,900 to 2,499 ( large ) and greater than 2,500 ( largest ). Id. The category with
most facilities is the small one. Id. Taking these data, the average prison in the United States holds
around 1,000 people.
144. As argued infra Section III.B, these prisons represent entire communities that rely on them
for jobs and economic stability that are likely to fight for them to remain open.
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While the reasons behind the support of reformist or transformational agendas
are diverse and distinct, Benjamin Levin has identified two frameworks to
understand the various justifications given for reform. One is the “over”
framework, which holds that “there may be an optimal rate of incarceration or
criminalization, but the current rate is too high.”145 In other words, people support
decarceration as part of an acknowledgment that the state is incarcerating people
for too long and for too little. The other framework is the “mass” one. According
to it, “criminal law is doing ill by marginalizing populations and exacerbating
troubling power dynamics and distributional inequities.”146 Here, people support
decarceration as a way to impair the state from exerting control over marginalized
populations. These frameworks are not necessarily in conflict with each other, nor
are they always easily distinguished. However, “the mass frame is more (or at least
more explicitly) an ideological critique. In contrast, the over frame is more
ideologically indeterminate—the fiscal conservative, the libertarian, and the
liberal/progressive egalitarian all might adopt it.”147 Immigration detention raises
the same sorts of concerns as incarceration as seen through the prism of either of
these frameworks.
One simple way of explaining the “over” framework is that it asserts that
current incarceration levels are not cost-justified. There may be benefits to
incarceration, but we are currently simply spending too much money without seeing
them (and in fact, at current levels, incarceration may be net-negative).148 To see
whether immigration detention is also not cost-benefit justified, we must first
understand what the goals of immigration detention are. According to the INA,
immigration detention is meant to either avoid flight risk or protect the
community.149 In other words, immigration detention is supposed to ensure that
people attend their immigration removal hearings and/or protect the community
from potentially violent people while they adjudicate their immigration trials.
Preoccupations around flight risk mainly serve to detain arriving asylum
seekers with no connections to the United States under the idea that because they
have no connections, there are fewer ways to find them if they abandon their

145. Levin, supra note 21, at 262.
146. Id. at 263.
147. Id. at 273.
148. See, e.g., Vikrant P. Reddy & Marc A. Levin, Right on Crime: A Return to First Principles for
American Conservatives, 18 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 231, 235–37 ( 2014 ) ( highlighting that “Americans pay
dearly for . . . extremely high rates of incarceration” both monetarily, socially, and in terms of public
policy opportunity cost; and that the “the high cost of incarceration supports a system that often does
not work” ).
149. See Immigration and Nationality Act § 236, 8 U.S.C. § 1226( c )( 2 ); see also Fatahi, 26
I. & N. Dec. 791, 793 (2016 ) (“An alien who seeks a change in custody status must establish to
the satisfaction of the Immigration Judge and the Board that he is not ‘a threat to national security, a
danger to the community at large, likely to abscond, or otherwise a poor bail risk.’” ( citing Guerra, 24
I. & N. Dec. 37, 39 ( 2006 ) ) ).
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frivolous claims.150 On the other hand, concerns about safety are more often
invoked when detaining an individual who has been in the United States for enough
time to have a criminal record.151
In any case, for immigration detention to be at the “right” level, we would
expect that as detention rose there would be fewer immigrants missing their removal
hearings and/or fewer crimes being committed by people in removal proceedings.
Neither of these figures have changed as immigration detention has increased
(and in fact, they are both relatively rare).152 In other words, detention does not
contribute to making more people appear at their removal hearings, nor does it
contribute to safety. According to one estimate, the federal government spends
over three billion dollars a year on immigration detention.153 It is hard to see how a
policy with such costs that has not delivered on its own key performance indicators
is cost-justified.

150. See Guerra, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 40 (outlining the criteria used to determine an individual’s
custody status, notably: length of residence in the United States, family ties in the United States, a fixed
address in the United States, a record of appearing in court, and the manner of entry into the United
States ). All of these factors count against individuals who entered to claim asylum. Id.
151. See id. ( finding that criteria such as criminal record can be dispositive in assessing
dangerousness ). Of course, a criminal conviction is not dispositive. See Singh v. Holder, 638 F.3d 1196,
1206 (9th Cir. 2011 ) ( “[ N ]ot all criminal convictions conclusively establish that an alien presents a
danger to the community, . . . . ” ). However, because people entering are unlikely to have criminal
records, dangerousness is more often found in people who have already spent time in the United States.
This is not a bright line rule, and there are many exceptions, as custody determination is fact-specific
and particularized. See, e.g., Fatahi, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 794–95 (2016 ) ( finding that an individual
who had entered the United States with a passport stolen by terrorist groups posed a danger to
the community ).
152. See AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL, IMMIGRANTS AND FAMILIES APPEAR IN COURT: SETTING
THE RECORD STRAIGHT (2019 ), https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/sites/default/files/
research/immigrants_and_families_appear_in_court_setting_the_record_straight.pdf [ https://
perma.cc/QM95-H5DZ ] ( showing that only about sixteen percent of immigrants do not appear in
court and that this number has stayed constant over time ). In terms of safety, we know that immigrants
commit fewer crimes than the native born, and we have state-level evidence suggesting that the
relationship holds for undocumented immigrants as well. Although to my knowledge there are no
studies assessing criminality of those in removal proceedings, from these data we have nothing to infer
that removal proceedings are pushing immigrants to more criminality. From the analyses that we do
have, we see no correlation between higher levels of immigration detention of individuals with criminal
records and public safety. See Miles & Cox, supra note 9. If anything, given the high stakes of their
immigration case and the grave harm that could be caused by criminal legal involvement, we would
expect people in removal proceedings to be less of a danger to the community than the average citizen.
See WALTER A. EWING, DANIEL E. MARTÍNEZ & RUBÉN G. RUMBAUT, AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL,
THE CRIMINALIZATION OF IMMIGRATION IN THE UNITED STATES 1 (2015 ), https://
www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/sites/default/files/research/the_criminalization_of_immigration_
in_the_united_states.pdf [ https://perma.cc/AP8L-AGH2 ]; ALEX N OWRASTEH , C ATO
INST., CRIMINAL IMMIGRANTS IN TEXAS: ILLEGAL IMMIGRANT CONVICTION AND ARREST RATES
FOR HOMICIDE, SEX CRIMES, LARCENY, AND OTHER CRIMES (2018 ), https://www.cato.org/sites/
cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/irpb-4-updated.pdf [ https://perma.cc/6QBQ-RFQX].
153. NAT’L IMMIGR. F., THE MATH OF IMMIGRATION DETENTION, 2018 UPDATE: COSTS
CONTINUE TO MULTIPLY 2 ( 2018 ), https://immigrationforum.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/
Math-of-Detention-2018-Update-FINAL.pdf, [ https://perma.cc/SJ23-55RE].
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Another possibility is that the current immigration detention level is justified
under a deterrence theory. While not identified in the INA as such, the U.S.
government has articulated that immigration detention serves as a deterrent for
people coming to the United States to seek frivolous immigration claims.154 If
immigration detention is justified, then we would expect that arrivals would see
mirror images, perhaps lagged, of arrivals and detention. This relationship does not
exist.155 The reality is that migration patterns are far too complex, and information
about the possibility of detention in the destination country is too remote for these
types of policies to disincentivize migration. Assuming for the sake of argument
that detention does have a deterrent effect, it is outweighed by the opportunity cost
of staying in the home country and discounted by informational gaps and behavioral
biases that impede people from calculating the probability of detention.156
Many immigration scholars and advocates have made arguments for curbing
immigration using the “over” framework. One common proposal is to expand the
use of alternatives to detention because these are more humane, equally capable of
guaranteeing future appearances in immigration court, and much cheaper.157 Others
have called for improving the conditions of detention.158 Following this approach
would be more costly than using the current carceral infrastructure, which would
mean spending more per immigrant detained, and therefore, make detention
much rarer. An alternative approach, which would be less costly, is to eliminate
detention altogether in favor of a system of “civil supervision.”159 Finally,
many have articulated that the institutional design of immigration proceedings
should be changed so that adjudicators rely less on detention.160 All of these

154. See R.I.L.-R. v. Johnson, 80 F. Supp. 3d 164, 188–89 (D.D.C. 2015 ) ( showing an argument
by the federal government that detention could serve as a message to those “who may be considering
immigration” ). Immigration judges often articulate similar preoccupations. See D-J-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 572,
579 ( 2003 ) ( finding that the release of an individual who unlawfully entered the United States by sea
would encourage “unlawful mass migrations” ).
155. The number of total apprehensions in the border and the interior dropped from about
1.3 million people in 2001 to just around 500 thousand in 2017, while immigration detention’s ADP
has consistently increased. See Ryo, supra note 78, 101 fig.2.
156. See Ryo, supra note 55, at 241 ( arguing that there are three “deterrence hurdles” impeding
any deterrent effect: immigrants do not know about detention, even if they know, it may be impossible
for them to factor the possibility of detention into their decision making about migrating, and that even
if detention is factored in immigration decisions, its risk will probably still be net positive ).
157. See, e.g., Torrey, supra note 81, at 879–913 (arguing that the mandatory detention statute in
the INA could be interpreted in a way to give ICE more discretion over custody determinations ).
158. See, e.g., Dora B. Schriro, Improving Conditions of Confinement for Immigrant
Detainees: Guideposts Toward a Civil System of Civil Detention, in THE NEW DEPORTATIONS
DELIRIUM: INTERDISCIPLINARY RESPONSES 57, 58 ( Daniel Kanstroom & M. Brinton Lykes eds., 2015 );
see also García Hernández, supra note 29, at 1405 ( arguing for a “truly civil” detention system ).
159. See Lima-Marín & Jefferis, supra note 28, at 970.
160. See Das, supra note 29, at 155 ( arguing that there is an overreliance on detention and that
there is a legal burden-shifting mechanism that impairs the government’s ability to gather the
information necessary to properly only use detention when it is necessary ); see also Mark Noferi,
Cascading Constitutional Deprivation: The Right to Appointed Counsel for Mandatorily Detained
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reform proposals implicitly suggest that at least some measure of immigration
detention/supervision is necessary or justified to achieve the goals of immigration
law, just as some measure of incarceration is necessary or justified to achieve the
goals of criminal law.
Explaining why rising immigration detention is problematic from the
perspective of the “mass” framework is much more straightforward than from that
of the “over” framework. To recall, the “mass” framework is an ideological critique
of the penal system that sustains that it is weaponized to marginalize certain groups
and further structural inequities and unequal power dynamics. Much of the critical
theory around immigration detention has made this same argument: that this is
precisely the objective both of criminalizing immigration in general, and of
immigration detention specifically. Probably the strongest articulation of this
critique was made by César Cuahutémoc García Hernández, who argued that
“immigration imprisonment . . . operates as a means of class-based exploitation.”161
One need not go as far as abolishing detention, however, to recognize that
immigration detention can serve to otherize or marginalize immigrants just as it
does with certain communities of U.S. citizens in the criminal incarceration context.
As more fully articulated in Section III, the very act of imprisoning immigrants may
further negative perceptions towards them. If we believe this to be true, then—in
the country with the largest foreign-born population in the world162—immigration
detention should at the very least be limited to those who are true threats to
the community and whose flight risk cannot be reduced through some alternative
to detention.163
This discussion helps to show that immigration detention is not a concern
because it looks like incarceration, but rather because it functions (or does not) in
very much the same way as incarceration. Through the “over” and/or the “mass”
frameworks, we can see that immigration detention raises similar concerns as
criminal incarceration. Therefore, advocates seeking to reduce our federal, state, and
local reliance on prisons should pay attention to a potential replacement of the
inmate with the immigrant. As argued in the preceding Section, there are many
incentives for local governments to turn to immigration detention as a way to
control the cost of decarceration. Yet, insofar as advocates of criminal legal reform
are motivated by the normative considerations outlined, immigration detention
raises those same concerns and should thus be incorporated into reform platforms.

Immigrants Pending Removal Proceedings, 18 MICH. J. RACE & L. 63, 74 ( 2012 ) ( arguing that immigrants
subject to mandatory detention be afforded counsel ).
161. García Hernández, supra note 29, at 249.
162. Phillip Connor & Gustavo López, 5 Facts About the U.S. Rank in Worldwide
Migration, PEW RSCH. CTR. ( May 18, 2016 ), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/05/18/
5-facts-about-the-u-s-rank-in-worldwide-migration/ [ https://perma.cc/WM3Z-SP88 ].
163. As Phil Torrey has argued, only a very small percentage of those subject to immigration
detention have a propensity for violence or are unlikely to appear in their removal procedures. See
Torrey, supra note 81, at 882.
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From the perspective of immigration advocates, articulating immigration
detention as part of the criminal legal system (as I have tried to do) will allow
detainees to be folded into discussions of criminal legal reform more generally. As
discussed supra, even with many caveats, there is mounting pressure to end carceral
exceptionalism in this country. We do not see the same impetus or broad agreement
behind changing immigration administration practices. In fact, the politics of
immigration reform are more fraught than ever. By wedding efforts to curtail the
use of immigration detention to large-scale criminal legal reform, advocates can
reframe the issue in a language different to that of migration. A language that has
higher chances of success. Also, because, as discussed in Section I, litigation in this
area is so fraught, strategic efforts should take advantage of the policy moment and
advocate for immigrants in tandem with criminal defendants. If, as scholars in the
field of crimmigration have argued for a long time, the legal distinction between
immigration and criminal law has evaporated, rather than fight this development,
efforts for reform should follow suit accordingly.
CONCLUSION
Ending immigration detention is a long way away. However, strategic
advocacy will be necessary to get there. Although in this Article I have not outlined
a specific path for advocacy, I have argued that anti-immigration detention
proponents should look for ways to incorporate their demands in decarceral
agendas writ large. Given executive primacy in immigration law, reform will not
offer change that will withstand anti-immigrant impulses from the White House.
Furthermore, courts have shown themselves to be inadequate spaces for changing
immigration detention practices. Rather than fighting crimmigration, therefore,
reformers need to lean into it and seek to end detention through broader efforts to
decarcerate the nation. The only way out is through.

